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ABSTRACT. 
Two research programs are brought together to contribute to the growing body of work on 
alternatives to standard welfare-based approaches to environmental valuation and policy. The 
first is the theoretical literature undermining the "new welfare economics." The second is the 
growing body of work on endogenous preferences. Both these research programs point to the 
necessity of interpersonal comparisons in welfare economics. This paper focuses on (1) the 
theoretical flaws in the use of Potential Pareto Improvements as a policy guide, (2) the “filtering” 
of expressed preferences through the axioms of consumer choice, and (3) the role of endogenous 
preferences in a reformulation of environmental valuation and policy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of mounting empirical evidence and a growing body of theory demonstrating the 
logical inconsistencies and empirical shortcomings of neoclassical welfare economics
1, this 
framework continues to dominate attempts by economists to place values on environmental 
features. Judging from the contents of the leading environmental economics journals, day-to-day 
work by applied economists is curiously disconnected from current work in mainstream 
economic theory. A time lag between theoretical frontiers and everyday practice is normal in any 
science, but its consequences are severe in the case of environmental valuation. Current U.S. 
policies on climate change and biodiversity preservation, for example, rely heavily on welfare 
economic models whose legitimacy depends crucially on weak theoretical formulations, and on 
assumptions known to be at odds with actual human behavior. Particularly problematic is the use 
of the concept of a Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) as one of the major economic tools for 
evaluating alternative environmental policies. 
Two problems mar the welfare-based cost-benefit approach to environmental policy. The 
first is the intractable theoretical difficulty of determining PPIs using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. 
The second problem is that empirical estimates of PPIs using cost benefit analysis (CBA) filter 
data collected from actual respondents by forcing them to fit the restrictive assumptions of 
consumer choice theory. These problems are connected in that they both point to the need for a 
valuation and decision-making framework that moves beyond the rational actor model of the 
new welfare economics (NWE)
2 and explicitly considers interpersonal welfare comparisons. As 
Sen (1970, 50) puts it “nothing much of interest can be said on justice without bringing in some 
interpersonal comparability.” 
The new welfare economics is summarized in two Fundamental Theorems:    4
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and firms 
are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and 
producers are selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium can be supported 
via the competitive mechanism, provided appropriate lump-sum taxes and transfers are imposed 
on individuals and firms. 
 These two theorems have been the backbone of neoclassical theory and policy in the decades 
since WWII. Lockwood (1987, 811) writes of the Second Theorem: “It is no exaggeration to say 
that the entire modern microeconomic theory of government policy intervention in the economy 
(including cost-benefit analysis) is predicated on this idea.” Likewise, Fisher (1983) writes: “The 
central theorems of welfare economics (i.e. the first and second fundamental theorems) may be 
the single most important set of ideas that economists have to convey to lay people...”  
 The Second Fundamental Theorem implies that if a particular state of the economy is judged to 
be desirable, it may be achieved through lump sum transfers. The rationale for distinguishing 
between alternative states of the economy is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. If the magnitude of the 
gains from moving from one state of the economy to another is greater than the magnitude of the 
losses, then social welfare is increased by making the move even if no actual compensation is 
made. This is a Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) and as Stavins, Wagner, and Wagner assert 
(2002, 5): “This is the fundamental foundation–the normative justification–for employing 
benefit-costs analysis, that is, for searching for policies that maximize the positive differences 
between benefits and costs.” Establishing environmental policies through the identification of 
PPIs to evaluate costs and benefits is central to the leading environmental economics texts.
3 A 
PPI is fundamentally different from the notion of Pareto efficiency that simply says that an   5
efficient state is one in which any change will make at least one person worse off. A PPI is a 
change that helps one person and harms another. 
Criticisms of NWE are frequently dismissed as attacks on a “straw man” (Pezzey and 
Toman 2002, 18) and this reaction is so prevalent it is worth discussing in some detail. The straw 
man criticism usually refers to attacks on the First Fundamental Theorem not on the Second 
Theorem. Economists rightly point out that few contemporary economists rely on the First 
Fundamental Theorem—externalities, market failures, and imperfect competition are almost 
universally recognized by economists. The Second Fundamental Theorem is then invoked to 
expose the naiveté of those who criticize the welfare economics approach—economists 
recognize that market failures must be corrected through enlightened government intervention. 
For example, Portney (2002, 1-2) writes: “Some criticize BCA [benefit-cost analysis] on the 
grounds that it supposedly enshrines the free market and discourages government intervention. 
However, BCA exists precisely because economists recognize that free markets sometimes 
allocate resources inefficiently, causing such problems as dirty air and water.”
4     
Another “straw man” response is that economists recognize the limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis and few advocate CBA as an exclusive policy tool.
5 It is true that many leading 
environmental economists are careful to point out its limitations (Hanley 1999; Portney 2002), 
but it is hard to deny that CBA drives the environmental policy recommendations of most 
economists. Most revealingly, environmental valuation studies that do not rely on neoclassical 
welfare economics are usually met with derision by mainstream economists. For example, 
regarding the attempt by Costanza et al. (1997) to value wetlands by estimating the cost of 
replacing nature’s service with human technological substitutes, Portney responded: 
“Ludicrous…Equating nature with its replacement worth is seductive, but from an economist’s   6
perspective, a non sequitur. Something’s economic benefit is determined by how much people 
are willing to pay for it” (Wall Street Journal on-line 2002). It may be valid to claim that attacks 
on the First Welfare Theorem are attacks on a straw man, but criticisms of the Second Theorem 
and its use by economists are much more serious and they are seldom addressed by the 
mainstream. 
The next section discusses the welfare foundations of CBA and the theoretical and 
empirical difficulties in calculating potential Pareto improvements. Section 3 examines the role 
of PPIs in the sustainability debate, section 4 discusses current research in endogenous 
preferences and its relevance to environmental valuation, section 5 presents some alternatives to 
the utilitarian welfare model, and section 6 concludes. 
 II. THE NEW WELFARE ECONOMICS AND COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS   
The new welfare economics grew out of the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. 
The idea of a welfare function is utilitarian in the sense that its goal is to measure individual 
wants and to construct an index of utility (Welch 1987). Classical utilitarianism focused on 
tradeoffs between different members of society and thus had a definite moral content. 
Interpersonal comparisons of utility were part of welfare theory as late as the 1920s as in Pigou’s 
argument that, because of the law of diminishing utility, “Any cause which increases the 
absolute share of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a 
contraction in the size of the national dividend…will in general, increase economic welfare” 
(Pigou 1920, 89). But with the ordinalist revolution and the positivist twist on utilitarianism by 
Hicks, Kaldor and Robbins, the moral content of welfare theory was abandoned. Income 
distribution was left to philosophers and politicians, not economists. Economics was to be 
“scientific” not “subjective.” Interpersonal comparisons of utility were to be avoided as being   7
“normative” value judgments not “positive” statements of fact. In recent years, however, 
problems with the NWE have led theorists to abandon, or at least move beyond, this narrow 
interpretation of the scope of economic inquiry. 
PPI Measures of Welfare Changes  
The difficulties with neoclassical welfare theory have been known for decades (Albert and 
Hahnel 1990). Until recently, however, problems such as the Scitovsky, Allais, and Boadway 
paradoxes were considered to be theoretical anomalies having little relevance to practical 
applications of the PPI principle. Current work, however, in behavioral economics and game 
theory shows that actual human behavior is better explained by the “paradoxes” than by the 
axiomatic model of consumer choice. There are sound behavioral explanations for the widely 
observed deviations from “rational” economic behavior. 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion seems straightforward. If one person values his gains from an 
economic change more than a second person values her losses, potential total welfare increases 
so this represents a potential Pareto improvement. Such a change is justified even if no actual 
compensation is paid. Most economists have followed Kaldor’s view that economic policy 
recommendations should be determined by efficiency; distribution is a problem for politicians.
6 
Undermining this separation argument are more than fifty years of theoretical work 
demonstrating that PPIs cannot be identified by comparing individual welfare changes.  
Theoretical Difficulties with the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion  
The PPI criterion was supposed to allow economists to make policy recommendations regarding 
any two points on different utility possibilities curves such as those shown in Figure 1. But 
Scitovsky (1941) demonstrated that if a movement from one point to another in utility space can 
be shown to be Pareto improving according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, then it may also be   8
shown that a movement back to the original point is also Pareto improving. Using the PPI    
 
Figure 1 About Here 
 
criterion a movement from point X to point X’ should be made since from X’ it is possible to 
move to X’’ where both consumers are better off compared to the original point X. It is also true, 
however, that a movement from X’ to X is justified because from X it is possible to move to 
point X’’’ where both consumers are better off compared to the starting point X’ (see Varian 
1992, chapter 22).
7 To eliminate this cycling problem, Scitovky proposed a double criterion for a 
potential Pareto improvement. It must be shown that the gainers from a change can compensate 
the losers so they will agree to the change (Kaldor criterion), and it must also be shown that it is 
not possible for the losers to bribe the gainers not to make the move (Hicks criterion). But 
Gorman (1955) showed that the Scitovsky criterion violates the transitivity assumption (see 
Suzumura 1999, figure 3).  
 The PPI was an attempt to broaden the Pareto criterion without making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Another attempt was constructing a social welfare function (SWF) to 
choose a point on a grand utilities possibilities frontier or on a production possibilities frontier 
(PPF). Figure 2 shows that using a SWF might “stick” the choice at either A or B, on a particular 
PPF, depending on which was the starting point. If the initial Pareto equilibrium is at B with 
associated social welfare functions WB1 and WB2, point B would be preferred to point A because 
it is on a higher social welfare curve. On the other hand if the starting point is A with its 
associated social welfare curves WA1 and WA2 then point A would be preferred to point B. 
   9
Figure 2 About Here 
 
A change in initial distribution of goods (income) means a change in the reference points 
that determine Pareto optimality. The points A and B on the production possibilities frontier are 
associated with points A’ and B’ within an Edgeworth box for each amount of goods X and Y. 
Each utility possibilities frontier in Figure 1 can be derived from one of the two contract curves 
for consumption shown in Figure 2. The necessary condition for general Pareto optimality is that 
the slope of the PPF, the rate of product transformation of Y into X (RPTY for X), is equal to the 
common marginal rates of substitution Y for X (MRSY for X) in consumption for each person. 
These slopes will be different at different points along the PPF, meaning that in competitive 
equilibrium, the price ratios for X and Y will be different at A and B. This general independence 
of welfare distributions and relative prices means that we cannot make general equilibrium 
statements comparing points on the PPF.  
 Boadway (1974, 926) demonstrated that “when comparing alternative projects or policies, the 
one with the largest net gain is not necessarily the ‘best’ one in the compensation sense.” The 
Boadway paradox, like the Scitovsky paradox, arises from the fact that estimates of income 
compensated welfare gains, at constant prices, are partial equilibrium measures. These measures 
coincide with general equilibrium measures only if there is a single market-clearing price ratio at 
every point on the contract curve, a condition that holds only if preferences are identical and 
homothetic (Jones 2002). If relative prices change with a redistribution of income, as they almost 
certainly would in a general equilibrium system, then PPI estimates are incorrect measures of 
potential welfare gains.  
 Numerous other theoretical dilemmas with the PPI approach have been identified. Brekke (1997)   10
shows that the choice of a numeraire matters when the marginal rates of substitution differ 
among consumers. Samuelson (1950) showed that it is not certain that group A is better off than 
group B even if group A has more of everything. A basic problem for welfare economics is that 
the axioms of consumer choice refer to a single individual or a representative agent, and they 
break down in the case of two or more persons (Chipman and Moore 1976). In the case of two or 
more persons, even within the narrow framework of neoclassical welfare theory, it cannot even 
be proved that more is preferred to less–perhaps the basic assumption of modern economics 
(Bromley 1990).  
 The upshot of these results for welfare economics is that the Kaldor-Hicks PPI rationale for 
comparing two states of the economy has some fundamental problems that preclude its practical 
application. There is no theoretically justifiable way to make welfare judgments without 
interpersonal comparisons of utility and this is not permissible under the stringent requirements 
of neoclassical welfare economics (Bromley 1990; Suzumura 1999). In 1978 Chipman and 
Moore (1978, 581) summarized the outcome of discussions about the Kaldor-Hicks-Samuelson-
Scitovsky new welfare economics: "After 35 years of technical discussions, we are forced to 
come back to Robbins' 1932 position. We cannot make policy recommendations except on the 
basis of value judgments, and these value judgments should be made explicit." This position is 
even more secure after another twenty-five years of theoretical discussions. 
Output Mix and Social Welfare 
The PPI criterion has also been used to argue that increases in output (shifts in the PPF) are an 
improvement because they are potentially welfare enhancing. But as Figure 3 shows, if output 
mix changes, it is possible that an increase in output can reduce social welfare. Suppose a 
technological change, indicated by an outward shift in the production possibilities frontier,   11
moves the economy from B to A. Assuming welfare increases with consumption, this move 
should be made under the Kaldor-Hicks test since total output (consumption) goes up. The   
 
Figure 3 About Here 
 
output of both goods can potentially be increased by moving from A to C. But in moving from B 
to A, welfare declines as indicated by the move from the social welfare function W3 to a lower 
social welfare function W2.  In economic arguments for growth, the separability principle is 
extended to say that output mix is a political not an economic problem. It is claimed that 
efficiency is a “positive” goal while the question of the proper mix of goods and productive 
inputs involves “normative” judgments.  An increase in efficiency is a good thing since it is 
theoretically possible for political authorities to redistribute the efficiency gains so that the 
physical output of both goods is greater (on W4). A basic simplifying assumption (as in the 
Nordhaus climate model discussed below) is that higher levels of total consumption (output) 
mean a higher level of total social welfare (for an explanation of the steps involved in going from 
maximizing utility to maximizing GNP see Dorfman 1993). Applying the efficiency rule would 
dictate a move from point A not to point C but rather to point D (since from D is theoretically 
possible to move to point E) on a higher PPF but an even lower social welfare curve W1. This 
shows that output mix as well as income distribution, both ignored by the PPI criterion, should 
be essential elements in measures of social welfare changes.  
Preference Filtering in Empirical Cost-Benefit Studies   
So the first problem with CBA is the theoretical difficulty in calculating welfare changes. The 
second problem lies with the way neoclassical welfare economists empirically estimate the value   12
of losses and gains. At the core of neoclassical welfare theory is the rational actor model of 
human behavior. Individuals act to maximize utility according to consistent, constant, well-
ordered, and well-behaved preferences. In the rational actor model, preferences are exogenous, 
that is, other individuals or social institutions do not influence them. The argument for using 
individual preferences as the starting point is a powerful one. It is a good thing for individuals to 
have what they want, and each individual is the best judge of what he or she wants. According to 
Randall (1988, 217) economists are “doggedly nonjudgmental about people’s preferences.” But 
are they? In fact, by forcing individual preferences through the narrow funnel of rational choice 
theory, economists are denying individuals a whole range of choices falling under the rubric of 
endogenous preferences, that is, preferences that depend on the individual’s personal history, 
interaction with others, and social context.  
Figure 4 shows some of the ways collected information about consumer attitudes is 
filtered by economists through the axioms of consumer choice (transitivity, non-satiation, 
continuity, completeness) to fit the stylized “facts” of neoclassical welfare economics. Through 
these filters, subjectivism and values enter economics in a non-explicit way that is much harder 
to recognize than when making explicit value judgments. These filters take a variety of forms. 
For  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
example, in surveys using the contingent valuation method (CVM), “protest bids” are very 
common. These may be in the form of “extreme” bids of zero or infinity. One reason for these 
bids is the existence of lexicographic preferences—people may place absolute values on   13
environmental preservation and refuse to make trade-offs between environmental features and 
money (Stevens et al.; 1991; Spash and Hanley 1995). Lexicographic preferences are ubiquitous 
in CVM results although their share of total responses varies considerably (see Rekola 2003, 
Table 1). In many CVM surveys these bids are excluded from the analysis thereby 
disenfranchising those respondents. A recent trend in CVM studies is to filter out lexicographic 
preferences by designing surveys to elicit market-compatible responses.
8 Bid cards, for example, 
restrict choices in CVM surveys to a given set of offers, thus forcing them to conform to the 
normative assumptions of the investigator. Environmental features are forced to be equivalent to 
market goods. Sagoff (1988, 94) calls this a category mistake because analysts ask questions as 
if they were about objective facts, when these questions are really about subjective interests and 
desires (see the discussion in Keat, 1997). According to Sagoff (1994) equating “values” to 
“preferences” commits a fundamental category error. 
Considerable evidence exists that people value the medium and distant futures about the 
same (hyperbolic discounting). Yet cost-benefit analysis uses straight line discounting to 
evaluate environmental features. Another ubiquitous filtering of preferences is the use of 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) rather than Willingness to Accept (WTA) measures of environmental 
value. One justification for this is the assumption of “systematic rationality” which ignores 
known behavioral patterns like the endowment effect. According to the authors of the influential 
NOAA panel report (Arrow et al. 1993) “The conceptually correct measure of lost passive-use 
value for environmental damage that has already occurred is the minimum amount of 
compensation that each affected individual would be willing to accept.” In spite of this the 
NOAA panel recommends the WTP measure: “The willingness to pay format should be used 
instead of the compensation required because the former is the conservative choice” (Arrow et   14
al. 1993, 32), and also due to “The cause of concern that respondents would give unrealistically 
high answers to such questions” (Arrow et al. 1993, 4). What constitutes an “unrealistically 
high” answer is not discussed, nor is why a “conservative choice” is best even though it is 
theoretically inferior. Again, if economists really mean to take consumer sovereignty seriously, 
they should not filter consumer preferences by imposing their own criteria as to what constitutes 
a reasonable response.  In spite of strong criticism (Bromley 1998; Knetch 1994; Spash 2002a) 
WTP measures are almost always used in CVM studies. 
The insistence on self-regarding rationality (independent choices) ignores the widespread 
evidence that people act to affect the well-being of others both positively and negatively (Gintis 
1998, 2). Collective choice based on “other-regarding behavior” is restricted in the rational actor 
model. The actions of others also affect our choices. As Sagoff (1988) points out, people make 
different decisions as citizens than they make as consumers. Willingness to sacrifice for future 
generations or protecting wild species, for example, is likely to be greater if one knows that 
others will also sacrifice. Although evidence for altruism exists even in individual actions, it is 
more likely to occur in a social context (Fehr and G@chter 2002). Finally, in the rational actor 
model, preferences are outcome regarding, that is, people care only about the quantities and 
qualities of goods exchanged. In reality, people are also concerned about the processes, 
particularly the issue of fairness (Gintis 1998). People care about process as well as outcome.  
III. POTENTIAL PARETO IMPROVEMENTS AND THE SUSTAINABILITY DEBATE 
Much of the environmental valuation literature is concerned with the issue of 
sustainability, and here too the PPI concept is invoked by environmental economists to argue 
that sustainability policies should be judged according to their relative efficiency in maintaining 
total economic output. In these models of sustainability, income distribution and output mix are   15
ignored.  Only total output counts.
9 For example, Nordhaus’ (1992, 2001) models of global 
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In his estimates of [1] Nordhaus uses a Bernoullian utility function where total utility (social 
welfare) is equal to the logarithm of the flow of per capita consumption c(t) at time t times 
population P(t) at time t. In his DICE model future utility (consumption) is discounted at the real 
interest rate, D. A CES utility function forces the elasticity of substitution to be the same between 
any pair of consumption choices. The world's consumers are lumped together into a single 
representative agent (eliminating any concern with the welfare paradoxes discussed above). A 
single constant-returns-to-scale firm produces the world’s economic output. Using this model, 
climate change policies are evaluated by comparing the before and after effects on discounted 
aggregate world economic output. Nordhaus' conclusion, that certain climate mitigation policies 
are too costly from society’s point of view, is based on an application of the PPI concept at the 
global economy level. Nordhaus' DICE and RICE models are much more than harmless 
academic exercises to frame the policy issues. They have been widely cited by policy makers as 
proof that aggressive policies to combat global warming are not cost effective.  
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over all feasible alternative consumption paths c(τ), where U(c(τ)) is “the most general, idealized 
utility function comprising both direct consumption as well as the enjoyment of non-market   16
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where W(t) is the maximized total welfare function from equation [2] (the original formulation 
of equation [3] is given by Pezzey 1989). Stavins, Wagner and Wagner (2002) are explicit in 
their use of the PPI, including the separation principle, to judge whether equations [2] and [3] 
indicate non-declining welfare over time. They write (2002, 5): 
Economists resort instead [of the strict Pareto criterion] to seeking ‘potential’ Pareto 
improvements in the Kaldor-Hicks sense–the world is viewed as being made better off if 
the magnitude of the gains and the magnitude of losses are such that the gainers can fully 
compensate the losers for their loses and still be better off themselves. Note again that 
under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the change is considered to be an improvement whether 
or not the compensation actually takes place. Actual compensation of losers by winners is 
essentially left to the political process. 
 
In their policy prescriptions, leading environmental economists seem unaware of the 
current literature in welfare economics. Since this is unlikely, a more plausible explanation of the 
continued advocacy of the PPI criterion by these economists is that they hold such strong 
ideological biases about the notions of efficiency, economic growth, and the superiority of 
market outcomes, they choose to ignore the theoretical difficulties involved (Bromley 1990; 
Koning and Jongeneel 1997, section 5). Economic arguments at first blush seem convincing. But 
we are frequently led by a leap of faith from “common sense” to neoclassical welfare theory. For 
example, in a recent paper Hanley and Shogren (2001) assert that “...decisions researched over   17
nature conservation using economic analysis are in some sense better than decisions reached 
without such an analysis.” What economist would argue with this? But later in their paper 
“economic analysis” turns on the Potential Pareto Improvement criterion, “Can the gainers 
compensate the losers and still be better off?”, an unanswerable question in the new welfare 
economics framework. 
IV. ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND REAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
If human preferences are to be the starting point for economic policy, models of human 
choice should describe behavior as it really exists and not as it “ought to be” to make them 
tractable in a neoclassical welfare economics framework. Recent research shows that preferences 
are endogenous, that is, they depend on the social context of individual choice. Several kinds of 
endogenous preferences are particularly relevant to environmental valuation: 
The endowment effect - One of the major reasons for WTA>WTP is the endowment effect. It 
seems to be a psychological law that people prefer something they already have to something 
they do not have (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The hypothesis that losses are systematically 
valued more than equivalent gains has been verified in numerous experiments. Tests of the 
endowment effect have shown that it is not due to wealth effects, income disparities, strategic 
behavior or transactions costs (Knetch 1989). Dozens of experiments show that preferences 
depend on the direction of the change, that is, whether people are paid to give up something they 
have, or have to pay to get something they do not have. The psychological model makes good 
predictions of economic behavior; the rational actor model does not.
11   
Process regarding preferences - In environmental policy the process of arriving at a decision 
may be as important for public acceptance as the actual outcome itself. For example, in the 
ultimatum game, a “proposer” is given a sum of money and instructed to share it with a   18
“respondent” who can either accept or reject the offer. Results of the game (mean offers and 
rejection rates) vary significantly according to the process through which money is obtained and 
offers are made. Offers are substantially lower if proposers win their position by doing well on a 
quiz (Hoffman et al. 1994). Rejection rates are much lower if respondents are told that the offers 
were generated by a computer (Blount 1995). In the prisoner’s dilemma game, defection rates 
are significantly higher if the game is referred to as the “Wall Street Game” rather than the 
“Community Game” (Ross and Ward 1996). Results from these and numerous other studies in 
game theory, experimental economics, and behavioral economics show that models that do not 
take into account social processes such as community norms about fairness are poor predictors of 
economic behavior. Preferences are socially conditioned (Brekke and Howarth 2000, 2002). 
These findings are at odds with the neoclassical welfare model in which ends are given.  
Time inconsistency and hyperbolic discounting - Time consistency is critical to the standard 
economic assumption that benefits delivered in the future should be discounted at a fixed rate. 
But behavioral studies indicate that people discount the near future at a higher rate than the 
distant future and they have different discount rates for different kinds of outcomes (Gintis 2000; 
Laibson 1997). Anticipation has been found to be a positive thing in itself and may result in 
something in the future having a higher value (Loewenstein 1987). This finding is relevant to 
environmental preservation policies such as preserving national parks and other wildlife areas 
because individuals may enjoy them more in the future (after retirement, for example) and the 
anticipation of this is important. Straight-line discounting is another filter that reduces the 
economic value of environment.  
Biased cultural transmission - According to standard theory, people choose among various 
options by carefully and consistently weighing them according to efficient welfare-maximizing   19
criteria. Results from a number of societies contradict this model of human behavior. Individual 
actors do not act as cost-benefit calculators who continuously adapt their behavior to changing 
environmental conditions. They may or may not respond “rationally” to incentives. The rational 
actor model has proved to be a poor predictor of economic behavior (Henrich et al. 2001). Good 
predictions can be made, however, using models of biased cultural transmission (Henrich 2003). 
By selectively imitating respected individuals, people may insure that innovations become 
established in a community. Whether or not a particular innovation is adopted depends not so 
much on its “superiority” as determined by cost-benefit calculations, but rather on its 
conformance with established cultural patterns. This has far-reaching implications for the design 
of environmental policies, and calls into question the widespread belief among economists that 
incentive-based policies are always preferred.   
Other regarding (social) preferences - Results from game theory and behavioral economics 
show that people act to affect the well-being of others, positively or negatively, even at 
significant cost to themselves (Fehr and Gächter 2002). A sense of fairness, including pure 
altruism, is a critical factor in economic decisions. This is illustrated in various game theory 
experiments such as the public goods game in which participants are willing to impose, at great 
cost to themselves, punishments on non-contributors, even in the last round of the game (Bowles 
and Gintis 2000). These kinds of behavior patterns have important consequences for judgments 
about environmental values and policy design.  
 Have the theoretical breakthroughs described above had any significant influence on the theory 
and methods of environmental economics? Judging from articles published in the leading 
environmental economics journals and looking at the environmental policy prescriptions of 
leading economists, one would have to say “no.” Neoclassical economists rightly point out that   20
the neoclassical paradigm has been extended far beyond the limits of traditional welfare analysis. 
But in empirical work environmental economists continue to fall back on the discredited 
framework of the new welfare economics. 
 Traditional welfare economics has many strengths, especially if we reject its extreme 
manifestations in post WWII neoclassical welfare theory. It remains a powerful statement of the 
worth of the individual and the rejection of “perfectionist” theories of human nature that have 
caused such havoc in the modern world. But individual preferences are distorted by forcing them 
into the straightjacket of the axioms of welfare economics, denying interpersonal comparisons of 
utility, and ignoring what has been learned about how humans actually make economic 
decisions. The expression of individual free will is shackled, not liberated, by the policy 
approach of the new welfare economics. 
V. ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES, REASONABLE VALUATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY  
How can we broaden public input to policy questions beyond welfare-based CBA criteria 
and market-based measures of public opinion? As a starting point for policy guidance it is useful 
to return to the discussion of endogenous preferences. As discussed above, numerous studies 
have shown that people are reluctant to give up something that they feel is theirs by right. This 
endowment effect (Gintis 2000) lends support to the notion of a safe minimum standard (SMS) 
and the precautionary principle. The SMS approach (Ready and Bishop 1991), the notion of 
“stewardship” (Brown 2001), and many other similar suggestions explicitly recognize that 
irreversible environmental damage should be avoided unless the social costs of doing so are 
“unacceptably high.” The concept is necessarily vague because it does not rely on a single 
money metric as does CBA. It recognizes that environmental losses should be valued higher than   21
economic gains, that a great amount of uncertainty is involved in judging the effects of 
environmental losses, and that there are limits to substituting manufactured goods for 
environmental resources. Interesting work is being done sorting out the different kinds of 
uncertainty facing environmental policy-makers (Spash 2002b, chapters 4 and 5). With the 
increasing threat of global and potentially catastrophic environmental changes, environmental 
policy must come to grips with strong uncertainty together with very serious consequences of 
making wrong decisions.   
Work in welfare theory is also being done to move environmental valuation and policy 
beyond mere preference evaluation. People’s individual preferences may be incompatible with 
long-term human survival (McDaniel and Gowdy 2000). Rights based or deontological values 
are widely held by the public, as indicated by numerous valuation surveys (Lockwood 1998; 
Spash 1997; Stevens et al. 1991). A rights-based approach is appropriate for policies affecting 
future generations. Do future generations have a right to clean air, clean water, and an interesting 
and varied environment? There is no reason to think that future generations would be any more 
willing than we are to have something taken away from them forever (especially things like a 
stable climate and biological species) as long as they are compensated by something “of equal 
value.” A rights-based approach to sustainability moves us away from the welfare notions of 
tradeoffs and fungibility toward the two interrelated concerns of uniqueness and irreversibility. 
As Bromley (1998, 238) writes: “Regard for the future through social bequests shifts the 
analytical problem to a discussion about deciding what, rather than how much, to leave for those 
who will follow.” The question of what to leave also moves us away from marginal analysis and 
concern only about relative amounts of resources, toward looking at discontinuous changes and 
total amounts of resources. Corning (2000) has outlined a “basic needs” approach to   22
sustainability whose starting point is the biological and psychological nature of the human 
species. Regardless of the characteristics of specific human cultures, we know that future 
generations will need, for example, nutritional food and clean water, appropriate health care, and 
a non-hazardous physical environment.    
The literature on endogenous preferences indicates that people care about means as well 
as ends.  Human preferences include strong feelings about how goods are produced, and about 
fairness in terms of economic rewards and distribution. The process of decision-making is 
important and the process itself shapes preferences. These ideas are extensively discussed in the 
valuation literature on discursive ethics (O’Hara 1996), deliberative democracy (Jacobs 1997), 
and stakeholder negotiation (O’Connor 2002). A growing trend is to combine environmental 
valuation with these various forms of deliberative processes. Reasonable valuation (Hiedanpää 
and Bromley 2002) recognizes that individuals are embedded in social institutions and that 
preferences are created and re-created as the decision-making process unfolds.   
Although it is not basic to the NWE framework, time consistency is almost always 
imposed on CBA calculations. This requires that the future be discounted at the same rate during 
all future time periods. The discount rate must be independent of the time period within which 
the costs and benefits occur. The existence of hyperbolic discounting implies that CBA may 
seriously underestimate the benefits of long-term environmental policies (Gintis 2000, 313). 
People also appear to have different discount rates for different kinds of outcomes (Loewenstein 
1987).  If we respect stated preferences, straight-line discounting should not be used to place 
values on distant-future environmental damages such as those caused by climate instability or 
biodiversity loss. Using a constant discount rate in the case of long-term damages has two other 
major disadvantages. First, policies are very sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. At a   23
discount rate of 1%, it is justified to spend 37 cents to avoid $1 damage in 100 years. At a 
discount rate of 4% it is only justified to invest 1.8 cents to avoid $1 damage in 100 years. 
Second, large damages in the future have almost no discounted present value and thus no effect 
on policy recommendations. For example, at a 5% discount rate the life of one individual at the 
present is worth more than a billion people 500 years in the future (Heinzerling and Ackerman 
2002).      
 Hyperbolic discounting has been widely discussed in the theoretical literature but the idea has 
had little impact on the policy recommendations of most economists. Exceptions include 
Cropper and Laibson (1999) who recommend using hyperbolic discounting in the case of global 
warming and Chichilnsky (1996) who uses hyperbolic discounting in her model of sustainable 
development.  Of course, this is not to say that straightline discounting should be discarded in all 
capital investment decisions. 
The standard attack on critics of NWE—that it is wrong to criticize the dominant theory 
unless a full-blown alternative is presented—is no longer valid (if it ever was). A number of 
alternative approaches to welfare theory are now being refined. The most prominent of the new 
welfare theorists is Sen (1970, 1977, 1997) who has constructed a theory of welfare economics 
based explicitly on moral premises. Sen, Fine (1975), Harsanyi (1977), and Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1977), to mention only a few, have proposed various ways to construct “quasi-
orderings” based on interpersonal welfare comparisons. These necessarily involve ethical 
judgments. Also relevant is the contemporary literature on the determinants of subjective well-
being. Psychologists and economists have established that meaningful information about welfare 
(well-being) can be gathered from surveys asking peoples about their internal mental states (see 
the essays in Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz 1999). Pezzey (1992) proposes an empirical   24
approach to constructing a sustainability function based on psychological experiments on time 
preferences. The findings of Easterlin (1995), Frank (1985), Johansson-Stenman, Carlson and 
Daruvala (2002) and many others imply that it is possible to construct welfare measures that 
reflect more meaningful changes in well-being than do NWE compensation measures.  
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In spite of valiant attempts to build a positive, value-free science, neoclassical welfare 
economics remains an ethical and ideological system. Decades of theoretical work shows that, 
even if we grant all the restrictive assumptions of welfare economics, from Homo economicus to 
perfectly operating competitive markets, there is no way to “close” the neoclassical welfare 
system from within. There is no way to pick a particular Pareto optimal distribution without 
appealing to an ethical judgment. The potential Pareto improvement principle was promoted as 
an alternative to the social welfare function that brought economic theory uncomfortably close to 
making interpersonal comparisons of utility. But if we give up the PPI as a policy guide, 
economic policy recommendations must be replaced by explicit social welfare judgments, a 
distasteful prospect for many economists.
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  The arguments presented in this paper are not meant to be a critique of all attempts to put 
numbers on the benefits and costs of moving from one state of the economy to another. I only 
criticize the framework of neoclassical welfare economics currently underlying most calculations 
of costs and benefits. Judging from the literature, and from conversations with cost-benefit 
advocates, most economists do not appreciate the theoretical difficulties involved in estimating 
welfare changes. And most non-economists are unaware of the leap-of-faith required in going 
from “estimating costs and benefits” to calculating a “Potential Pareto Improvement.” Finally, 
there seems to be a lack of appreciation of the difference between individual choice (“BCA   25
counts no values other than those held by the individual members of society.” Portney 2002) and 
the restrictive assumptions of rational economic man imposed on cost benefit calculations. On 
one level we can agree with Pearce (1992): “What economic valuation does is to measure human 
preferences for or against changes in the state of environments.” Since all policy choices are 
made by humans, obviously some calculations of “preferences” lie behind any environmental 
policy. How these preferences are determined is the bone of contention. Are they forced into the 
straightjacket of welfare economics or are they allowed to be expressed in the full range of 
human experience?  Homo economicus, whose ghost lurks behind the policy recommendations 
of mainstream environmental economists, has lost out in the struggle for survival both within and 
outside the economics profession. Fifty years of theoretical analysis have demonstrated the 
impossibility of making welfare judgments without interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
Evolutionary biology has shown that it is "rational" to care about others including the welfare of 
future generations and non-human species (van den Bergh and Gowdy 2003).  
If we are to embark on the road to sustainability, meaning social harmony and 
environmental resilience, we must be guided by economic theories based on a solid scientific 
and theoretical framework. This framework is being constructed by economists working both 
inside and outside the professional mainstream. The task of constructing such a framework 
would be easier and faster if environmental economists would turn their attention toward 
contemporary models of human decision-making, and away from sterile applications of flawed 
theories.    26
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. Mainstream economics is becoming so diverse that the term “neoclassical” is increasingly 
hard to define. I use the term “neoclassical welfare economics” to denote that branch of 
neoclassical theory based on the “New Welfare Economics” described in this paper. 
2. The new welfare economics was a reaction, in the late 1930s, to the "old" welfare economics 
of Pigou. Building on Pareto, it attempted to construct a welfare economics based on ordinal 
utility and without relying on interpersonal utility comparisons. Two broad approaches to this 
task were the compensation criteria approach discussed above and the social welfare function 
approach of Bergson, Samuelson and others. This second approach did not concede that ethical 
judgments were necessary. According to Arrow (1951, 108) "[The] 'new welfare economics' says 
nothing about choices among Pareto-optimal alternatives. The purpose of the social welfare 
function was precisely to extend the unanimity quasi-ordering to a full social ordering."  
3. See Russell (2001, 51-52); Hanley, Shogren and White (2001, 69-72); Kolstad (2000, 36-38) 
(who gives an informative discussion of social welfare functions and criticisms of the utilitarian 
perspective, 38-41); and Kahn (1998, 108-109).   
4. In the same vein, Fullerton and Stavins (1998) present a lucid defense of the standard 
approach by invoking four “myths” about economists. The first myth is that “economists believe 
that the market solves all problems” and their correction to the myth is that government 
intervention is frequently necessary to correct market failures (the Second Fundamental 
Theorem). The second is “the myth that economists always recommend a market solution.” But 
most of the discussion of this “myth” is an argument for tradable permits, a market-based policy 
tool based on the Second Theorem. The third is the myth “that when non-market solutions are   36
considered, economists still use only market prices to evaluate them.” Again the debunking of 
this myth falls back on the Second Theorem—market prices need to be corrected for market 
failures. Fullerton and Stavins are correct in referring to these three myths as attacks on a straw 
man. But the fourth myth is that “economic analyses are concerned only with efficiency rather 
than distribution”, which is exactly the cornerstone of the Hicks-Kaldor PPI (see footnote 5) and 
the basis of contemporary cost benefit analysis. This is not a myth. The point that economists are 
concerned with efficiency, and that questions of distribution should be left to politicians, is made 
four times in a nine page paper by Stavins, Wagner and Wagner (2002).  
5. The claim is sometimes made that although CBA should not be the only policy 
criterion, it is still a valuable tool. But even if traditional CBA is considered as only one input 
into a larger political process it is still of no use if estimates based on welfare economics are 
unreliable. CBA is based on summing individual choices made independently in a market 
context, but the real policy challenge is the messy task of reconciling individual differences in a 
social context until a consensus emerges. In formulating environmental policy, costs and benefits 
involve an array of economic, social and environmental values. Attempts have been made to 
incorporate endogenous preferences into a CBA framework (Harris, Driver and McLauglin 
1989; Stenman 1998), but in the end collective action is resistant to the optimization framework 
of NWE. An emerging alternative to welfare based CBA is multi-criteria assessment (MCA). 
MCA, in various forms, evaluates projects on diverse criteria such as efficiency, equity, or 
sustainability, and allows for a more realistic assessment of substitutability and complementarity 
between criteria (O’Neill and Spash 2000). 
6. The separation argument and the related compensation principle have an interesting history. 
The early formulators of the principle exhibited a deeper understanding of its implications than   37
later advocates. Chipman (1974, 579-581) makes the point that the separation principle makes 
more sense for a collectivist economy than under a laissez-faire system. If the question of fair 
and equitable income distribution is addressed by the political system, then it may be legitimate 
for economists to concentrate on the efficient allocation of resources in production. This was the 
position of Pareto and Barone, but this qualification in applying the PPI was abandoned by 
Hicks, Kaldor and those who followed them. Pareto wrote (1971 [1906], 366):"…one could say 
that the social organization might be changed in such a way that all members of the society could 
enjoy greater well-being, or at least some of those members could enjoy greater well-being 
without harming any others. Or one could say that the people who suffer from the social 
organization not being at maximum ophelimity could, if they were allowed to reach that 
maximum position, pay an amount such that everyone would find the new organization 
advantageous."  But according to Kaldor (1939, 550): "There is no need for the economist to 
prove—as indeed he could never prove—that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure 
nobody in the community is going to suffer. In order to establish his case, it is quite sufficient for 
him to show that even if all those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the 
rest of the community will still be better off than before. Whether the landlords, in the free-trade 
case, should in fact be given csompensation or not, is a political question on which the 
economists, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion." Modern dissenters include 
Mishan (1980) who argued that the PPI criterion might be justified if adequate safeguards are in 
place to insure that its effects will not be regressive and Little (1950) who believed that the 
question of income distribution is logically prior to the question of ideal output. 
7. As Varian (1992, p. 407) puts it: “[The compensation principle] gives no guidance in making 
comparisons between Pareto efficient allocations, and it can result in inconsistent comparisons.   38
Nevertheless, the compensation test is commonly used in applied welfare economics.” 
8. Johnston and Swallow (1999, 308), referring to evidence for "non-neoclassical" preferences, 
suggest: "Research may also identify means to minimize such behavior, and encourage 
respondents to apply neoclassical optimization to the full range of hypothetical survey 
scenarios." 
9. Exposing the fallacy of equating an increase in GNP with a welfare improvement has a long 
history in the neoclassical literature. As Chipman and Moore (1976) demonstrate, even if it is 
assumed that all the problems with measuring non-market goods (the value of leisure, 
"housepartners" services, externalities and public goods) could be resolved, fundamental 
difficulties remain with using GNP as a measure of actual welfare, not to mention potential 
welfare. If the proportion of goods changes, even in the simple case of two people with different 
tastes, an increase in GNP could easily decrease total welfare. The arguments by Chipman and 
Moore (1976), Samuelson (1950) and others are in some ways even more powerful than those of 
heterodox critics of GNP welfare measures because they clearly show that, even granting all the 
neoclassical welfare assumptions, and ignoring all the “second best” problems, increasing GNP 
is still an inadequate indicator of increasing welfare. 
10. In an analysis of sustainability, Stavins, Wagner and Wagner (2002, 6-7) write: "In theory, it 
may be argued that sustainability is ultimately the most desirable policy goal, but in practice it is 
more reasonable to aim for potential sustainability in the form of dynamic efficiency (of an all-
encompassing societal welfare function). We recognize that this opens an avenue for criticism of 
economics as being exclusively focused on efficiency rather than equity, but the efficiency 
criterion and related analytical methods are—ultimately—where the greatest strengths of 
economics lie."   39
11. The argument is sometimes made by economists that opinion surveys and laboratory 
experiments do not carry the same weight as revealed market preferences. First of all to say that 
market choices reveal what people really want ignores the well-known problems of price 
distortions due to externalities and market failure. One might claim that prices can be corrected 
for externalities (using CBA as Portney claims), but the public goods pricing problem is much 
more difficult. In any case, if choices are based on faulty price information they are unreliable as 
a policy guide. Second, as discussed in this paper, numerous studies indicate that people are not 
“rational” in their market choices (Kahneman 2003). Thirdly, reading the psychological 
literature, one cannot help but be impressed with the scientific rigor of modern behavioral 
research (see the papers in Kahneman, Schwartz, and Diener 1999). It seems to me that basing 
decisions affecting welfare or “well-being” on scientific evidence from hedonistic psychology 
could be more reliable than basing them on restrictive and haphazard market choices. For 
example, the sustainability debate could be enhanced by using a welfare function W(.) defined as 
well-being or happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2002) rather than using a wealth or income index. It is 
well-documented that the link between consumption (or income or per capita GDP) is weak 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002). Using scientific measures of happiness as an indicator of welfare would 
put the focus on sustaining or enhancing those things that really increase well-being.   
12. See the discussion of this point in Koning and Jongeneel (1997, section 5), which includes 
statements by prominent economists to the effect that the status and far-reaching authority of 
economists to comment on public policy would be undermined by abandoning the Potential 
Pareto Improvement principle. Blaug (1985) writes: “If we refuse, even in principle, to 
distinguish allocative efficiency from distributive equity, we must perforce reject the whole 
welfare economics and with it any conventional presumption in favour of competitive markets,   40
and indeed, in favour of the price mechanism as a method of allocating scarce resources. 
Arguments for co-ordinating economic activity by markets would then have to be expressed in 
terms of political philosophy–for example, that markets diffuse economic power–and economics 
would in consequence have to become a totally different subject.” Likewise, in a justification of 
using the market rate of interest as the CBA discount rate, Arrow et al. (1996) write: “The 
alternative—over-riding market prices on ethical grounds—opens the door to irreconcilable 
inconsistencies. If ethical arguments, rather than the revealed preferences of citizens, form the 
rationale for a low discount rate cannot ethical arguments be applied to other questions?”     41
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Figure 3. Efficiency and Social Welfare      
   44
   
Expressed preferences  Consumer Choice Axioms  Policy Implications 
Lexicographic Preferences            → Eliminated by Continuity Assumption                 →Everything is tradable 
Hyperbolic Discounting                → Eliminated by Time Consistency Assumption     → Straight line Discounting 
Endowment Effect                         → Eliminated by Symmetric Rationality                  → WTA=WTP 
Other-regarding Preferences        →  Eliminated by Independent Choice Assumption  →
No collective decisions, no pure 
altruism 
Process regarding preferences      → Outcome regarding-preferences                           →




Figure 4. Preference Filtering through the Axioms of Consumer Choice 
 